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This paper develops a simple signaling model of foreign currency borrowing that yields predictions 
about firm survival and performance during a currency crisis. Using a large panel of firm level data 
for South Korea we offer empirical support for many of the predictions of our model, while others 
support predictions that cannot be tested using our data. Our paper demonstrates that although firms 
that borrow in foreign currency are more likely to exit after the currency collapses, those that 
continue to produce perform better. Among them, the best performers are exporters whose foreign 
sales are more competitively priced under a devalued currency.   
 
Keywords: currency crisis, exports, foreign currency borrowing 
JEL Codes: F34, F41, G21, L25 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Mike Bleaney, John Driffill, Hans Genberg, Alessandra Guariglia, Junhan Kim, Tae-Hwan Kim, Mihye Lee 
and seminar participants at the Hong Kong Institute of Monetary Research, the University of Nottingham at Ningbo, 
China, the Research Workshop on Finance and Development at Limassol, Cyprus and the European Trade Study 
Group, Munich for comments on this paper. Mizen acknowledges with thanks the financial support of the Hong Kong 
Institute for Monetary Research. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 




** Corresponding author: Mateut: University of Nottingham, Jubilee Campus, Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK. Tel: 44-
115-8468122; Fax: 44-115-8466667; E-mail: simona.mateut@nottingham.ac.uk 
a Centre for Finance, Credit and Macro, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK;  
Bougheas: spiros.bougheas@nottingham.ac.uk 
Mizen: paul.mizen@nottingham.ac.uk 
b Bank of Korea, 39 Namdaemunno (110, 3-Ga, Namdaemunno), Jung-Gu, Seoul 100-794, Korea. hosung@bok.or.kr 





1.  Introduction 
It is well documented that before the East Asian 1997 crisis both the banking and corporate 
sectors of many Asian economies had become fragile through the accumulation of short-term debt 
that was denominated in foreign currencies. The fragility was exacerbated by the currency 
mismatch in their balance sheets. While their liabilities were vulnerable to a potential currency 
depreciation their incoming revenues and assets where valued in domestic currency. When 
commercial bank credit inflows of $50bn to the region in 1996 shifted to outflows of $21bn in 
1997 the mismatch in currencies led to a severe crisis. Since then, an extensive literature has 
analyzed the potential problems created by currency mismatch (Krugman, 1998; Furman and 
Stiglitz, 1998; Radlett and Sachs, 1998; Chang and Velasco, 1999; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 
1999; Bleaney et al., 2008) and provided a fertile ground for new models of currency crises and 
contagion that have embedded these features in open economy credit channel models (see for 
example Aghion et al., 2004 and Cook and Devereux, 2006). More recently, renewed growth in 
foreign currency borrowing in Asia has been noted by many observers. At first, the exposure to a 
larger market with access to a wider group of investors was regarded as a positive step as many 
firms that issued debt or took out loans in international currencies were to some degree naturally 
hedged by their earnings in the same currency. However, there are also concerns about the 
consequences of the large borrowings in international currency when exchange rates are more 
volatile. 
  Making a correct assessment about the costs and benefits of borrowing in international 
currencies requires that we account for the incentives of creditors to offer foreign currency loans 
and borrowers to accept them. In a recent empirical study Mora et al. (2013) have concluded that 
such loans are offered by formal lending sources, like banks, as they attempt to avoid currency 
mismatch on their balance sheets. In this paper, we concentrate on the demand side. We are 
particularly interested in examining those firm characteristics that increase the propensity to borrow 
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in foreign currency. Working with a detailed panel of South Korean manufacturing firms we assess 
whether the ability to access foreign lending offered firms in general, and exporters in particular, 
any advantages around the East-Asian crisis of the 1990s.1 We argue that understanding why some 
firms borrow in foreign currency and others do not can also help us understand not only why some 
types of firms had higher survival rates, but also why some firms export and others do not and 
many other variations in post-crisis performance conditional on survival. 
 We motivate our empirical methodology by analyzing a simple signaling model of the 
loanable funds market.2 In our model, there are two types of firms separated according to their 
productivity. Financial markets are characterised by imperfect information, therefore lenders 
cannot observe productivity directly, but high-productivity firms can signal their type by borrowing 
in foreign currency and thus can obtain better financing terms. A firm that borrows in foreign 
currency takes the risk of being unable to service its debt following a depreciation of the domestic 
currency and thus being liquidated. We establish conditions that show only high productivity firms 
would choose to borrow in foreign currency. We then link this result to the heterogeneous firms’ 
literature in international trade (following the work of Melitz, 2003) which has established that 
exporters are on average more productive than non-exporters. Thus, the first prediction of our 
model is that exporters are more likely to obtain loans denominated in foreign currency. 
Then we compare the performance of firms before and after a sharp depreciation of the 
currency. Our model yields two sets of predictions. The first set of predictions is about firm 
survival. Firms that borrow in foreign currency are less likely to survive given the higher cost of 
servicing their debt and among these firms exporters have a higher survival rate. These predictions 
have been supported by a recent empirical study by Kim et al. (2015). More specifically, they find 
that small firms with large holdings of short-term foreign debt and small ratios of exports to total 
sales are significantly more likely to go bankrupt during the crisis than other firms. The second set 
of predictions are related to firm performance. Our model predicts that conditional on survival 
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firms that borrowed in foreign currency are less likely to be affected by the crisis and the least 
affected firms are likely to be exporters who benefit from the currency collapse making their goods 
more competitive in foreign markets. There appears to be little evidence on this last set of 
hypotheses and our paper focuses attention on these issues, finding substantial evidence to support 
them.   
For our empirical contribution we use a large panel of about 30,000 observations from 5,000 
South Korean manufacturing firms between 1990 and 2006.3 We distinguish between pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis outcomes for firms identified as exporters and non-exporters. Our data, 
provided by the Korean Information Service, document both the export share of sales and the 
foreign currency liabilities of individual firms. We assess our model in the following steps: Our 
first task is to check the prediction of our model that exporters are much more likely to obtain 
foreign currency loans is validated by our data. Then, we test the main predictions of our model 
using the change in sales pre- and post-crisis for exporters versus non-exporters to document the 
differences in performance between these types of firms. We find that exporters are much more 
likely to obtain foreign currency loans and foreign currency borrowing is associated with better 
firm performance post-crisis. In addition, exporters perform better after the crisis.  
Our work is related to a strand of the financial economics literature that uses firm level data 
to assess the consequences of financial crises for firm performance. Much of this research has been 
motivated by the East-Asian Crisis. For example, Claessens et al. (2000) analyze corporate 
performance before the crisis across a sample of East-Asian countries that includes economies both 
affected and unaffected by the crisis. Claessens et al. (2012) do a similar comparison for the period 
after the 2007-2009 crisis. To our knowledge the only detailed studies of the Asian crisis using 
firm level data from South Korea are Borensztein and Lee (2003), which explores the role of 
financial intermediaries in providing credit to corporations, and Gilchrist and Sim (2004), which 
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considers the impact of balance sheet factors on investment. We complement the above studies by 
taking into account the export status of firms and the currency denomination of their loans. 
Work related to the recent financial crisis has identified the drop in trade finance as a 
plausible cause for the collapse in global exports (Bricogne et al., 2012, France; Chor and Manova, 
2012, US). Amiti and Weinstein (2011) provide similar evidence using 1990s data from Japan, as 
do Askenazy et al. (2011) and Engel et al. (2013) for France, and Wagner (2015) for Germany. 
Lastly, Bougheas et al. (2015), in a study closely related to ours, compare the performance of 
exporters and non-exporters around the Brazilian 1999 crisis. None of the above studies considers 
the currency denomination of funds which is the main focus of our paper. A notable exception is a 
recent empirical paper by Castagnino et al. (2013) that analyzes exporting and access to finance in 
Argentina, where they find that once firms become exporters, access to foreign finance is positively 
correlated with their performance. However, their study focuses on a time period when there were 
no financial crises. 
Our work is also related to a group of theoretical papers that analyze a firm’s choice of the 
currency denomination of its loans. In Jeanne (2000, 2002), foreign currency borrowing protects 
firms against the lack of commitment by monetary authorities to support the currency peg. In 
contrast, the role of foreign currency in Chamon (2001) and Aghion et al. (2004) is to mitigate a 
moral hazard problem arising as a consequence of the possibility of default.4 In contrast, we offer 
a signaling explanation for the choice of currency denomination of loans and we also take it to the 
data. 
Lastly our work is related to a group of studies that identify the advantages of firms that 
sell their products across national boundaries. For example, it is well established that exporting 
firms are more resilient than non-exporting firms (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Explanations 
commonly offered for this observation is that exporters have more access to external funds (Campa 
and Shaver, 2001; Girma et al., 2004; Greenaway et al., 2007; Muûls, 2010; Spaliara and Tsoukas, 
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2013; Görg and Spaliara, 2013, 2014), are less exposed to demand fluctuations as their sales are 
more diversified (Denis et al., 2002), and have access to foreign loans as they can use their revenues 
from exports as collateral (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001). Despite the growth of empirical 
research assessing the relative performance of firms, lack of data on international borrowing has 
limited the evaluation of any advantage that foreign lending confers to exporting firms. We would 
also expect that any such advantage be more pronounced around periods of financial crises, 
however, as we argue below, the existing knowledge of relative firm performance around periods 
of financial turmoil is very thin.  
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2 we present the open-economy model of the 
credit channel that we use to analyze the relationship between firm-specific characteristics and the 
composition of external finance as well as to evaluate post-crisis performance. In Section 3 we 
explain our empirical methodology which we follow by a description of our dataset in Section 4. In 
Section 5 we present our results, and in Section 6 we conclude. 
 
2.   A Simple Model of Foreign Currency Borrowing 
The model has three periods (0, 1, 2). Period 0 is the planning period when all financial 
contracts are agreed and investments are made. Period 1 is an interim period when early investment 
returns are realized and creditors decide on whether to liquidate firms or let them survive for 
another period. The final period captures all the future benefits derived by surviving firms. All 
agents are risk-neutral and they do not discount the future.5 
There are two countries: a small open economy (domestic economy) and the rest of the 
world. Let 𝑒 denote the exchange rate (domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency). We 
assume that in period 0 the government pegs the exchange rate at 𝑒 = 1 and that all agents expect 
that in period 1 with probability 𝜃 this value will be maintained but with probability 1 − 𝜃 the 
domestic currency will depreciate, 𝑒 = 1 + 𝑥, (𝑥 > 0). 
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There are two types of firms: high-productivity (ℎ) and low-productivity (𝑙). Firm types 
are private information. Let 𝜋 denote the proportion of type ℎ firms. In period 0 all firms need to 
borrow an amount 𝐷 to invest in a project. The revenues of each project in period 1 depend on (a) 
firm type, (b) an idiosyncratic shock, and (c) the exchange rate. With probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 a type 𝑖 
firm (𝑖 = 𝑙, ℎ) fails, where 𝑝ℎ > 𝑝𝑙, and its revenues are equal to zero. Thus, when this 
idiosyncratic shock is negative the performance of the firm is independent of the exchange rate 
regime. With probability 𝑝𝑖𝜃 a type 𝑖 firm succeeds while the exchange rate stays fixed in which 
case revenues are equal to 𝑅𝑖0. Lastly, with probability 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝜃) a type 𝑖 firm succeeds but the 
exchange rate depreciates in which case revenues are equal to 𝑅𝑖𝑥. In period 2 the expected 
revenues of all firms conditional on survival are equal to 𝑉.6 We impose the following two 
restrictions on the revenues of successful firms: 
 
 𝑝ℎ(𝜃𝑅ℎ0 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑅ℎ𝑥 + 𝑉) > 𝑝𝑙(𝜃𝑅𝑙0 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑅𝑙𝑥 + 𝑉) > 𝐷    (1) 
 
 𝑅𝑙𝑥 < min⁡{𝑅ℎ0, 𝑅ℎ𝑥, 𝑅𝑙0}        (2) 
 
The inequalities in (1) state that all projects are profitable and that the expected revenues of high-
productivity firms are higher than the expected revenues of low-productivity firms. Inequality (2) 
states that the currency depreciation has a strong negative impact on low-productivity firms. Given 
that exporting firms are, on average, more productive (Melitz, 2003), a depreciation of the currency 
is more likely to benefit high-productivity firms. The currency depreciation will also affect the cost 
of intermediate inputs but there is no a priori reason to believe that this effect would be correlated 
with productivity. Given that the size of the loan is agreed with creditors before the potential change 




Financial markets are competitive and the risk-free interest rate is equal to zero. Following 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) we assume that returns are not verifiable which implies that 
borrowers will default in period 2. However, they might have incentives to repay their loans in 
period 1 if the lenders threaten to liquidate the projects in which case they will forgo all future 
profits. Let 𝐿 denote the liquidation value of a project.  
 
2.1 Domestic Currency Borrowing and Pooling Equilibrium 
For the moment we assume that loans are only denominated in domestic currency units. 
Given that types are private information any lending offer will be a pooling contract. Let 𝑍𝑝 denote 
the loan repayment in period 1 and ?̂? = 𝜋𝑝ℎ + (1 − 𝜋)𝑝𝑙. Then the repayment must satisfy the 
zero-profit condition of the lenders:  
 
 ?̂?𝑍𝑝 + (1 − ?̂?)𝐿 = 𝐷           
 




evaluated using the expected probability of success. This contract is feasible as long as two 
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that revenues in all states where firms succeed are 
sufficiently high to cover the repayment: 
 
  𝑅𝑙𝑥 ≥ 𝑍𝑝          (3) 
 
The second condition is that the contract must be incentive compatible, that is, borrowers do not 
have an incentive to strategically default. A borrower who defaults avoids the period 1 repayment 
but forgoes the continuation payoff. 
  




When these conditions are satisfied a pooling equilibrium exists. Both types of firms pay their debt 
when their projects succeed and survive to the next period. When their projects fail they get 
liquidated. However, there is cross-subsidization as all firms are charged the same interest rate. 
 
2.2  Foreign Currency Borrowing and Signaling 
Assume now that loans may be denominated in both domestic and foreign currency. When 
the currency depreciates the cost of servicing loans denominated in the foreign currency increases. 
High-productivity firms might be willing to take this risk if borrowing in foreign currency becomes 
a signal that separates them from low-productivity firms and thus allows them to borrow at lower 
interest rates. For this signaling strategy to work it must be too costly for low-productivity firms to 
borrow in foreign currency. 
 Given that in period 0 the exchange rate is equal to 1, the size of the loan is still equal to 𝐷. 
Under successful separation the zero-profit condition of lenders offering loans denominated in 
foreign currency is given by: 
 
  𝑝ℎ𝑍ℎ + (1 − 𝑝ℎ)𝐿 = 𝐷          
 
One necessary condition for the existence of a signaling equilibrium is that high-productivity firms 
prefer to borrow in foreign currency than borrowing under the pooling contract: 
 
  𝑍𝑝 > 𝑍ℎ(1 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑥)        (5) 
 
Clearly, 𝑍𝑝 > 𝑍ℎ, given that separation is feasible. However, under foreign currency borrowing 
with probability (1 − 𝜃) the currency depreciates in which case the repayment in domestic 
currency units rises. A second condition that a signaling equilibrium must satisfy is that only the 
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high-productivity firms generate sufficient revenues when the currency depreciates to cover the 
loan repayment. 
 
  𝑅ℎ𝑥 ≥ 𝑍ℎ(1 + 𝑥) > 𝑅𝑙𝑥        (6) 
 
When the above condition is satisfied, a low-productivity firm that has raised funds by borrowing 
in foreign currency will have to default when the currency depreciates and thus forgo all future 
revenues. Next, we compare the payoffs to a low-productivity firm from each currency borrowing 
option.  
The expected payoff of a low productivity firm that borrows in foreign currency is given 
by 𝑝𝑙(𝜃𝑅𝑙0 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑅𝑙𝑥 − 𝜃𝑍ℎ + 𝜃𝑉). With probability 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝜃) the firm is successful but 
because of the currency depreciation it cannot service its debt, defaults and gets liquidated. Thus, 
the firm repays the debt only when it is successful and there is no currency depreciation (probability 
𝑝𝑙𝜃) in which case it also receives the future payoff 𝑉. Consider now the expected payoff of a low-
productivity firm that borrows in domestic currency. Under successful separation of types, 
repayment is calculated using the probability of success of type 𝑙 firms, and the corresponding 
expected payoff is given by 𝑝𝑙(𝜃𝑅𝑙0 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑅𝑙𝑥 − 𝑍𝑙 + 𝑉). Then, if the following condition 
holds, a low-productivity firm will prefer to borrow in domestic currency: 
 
  𝑍𝑙 − 𝜃𝑍ℎ < 𝑉(1 − 𝜃)        (7) 
 
where 𝑍𝑙 satisfies the lender’s zero-profit condition  𝑝𝑙𝑍𝑙 + (1 − 𝑝𝑙)𝐿 = 𝐷 .   
 When (5), (6) and (7) are satisfied, there exists a signaling equilibrium where high-
productivity firms borrow in foreign currency and low-productivity firms borrow in domestic 
currency. Comparing these conditions we find that, for any given values of 𝑥 and 𝜃, a signaling 
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equilibrium becomes more likely as the differences 𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝑙 and 𝑅ℎ𝑥 − 𝑅𝑙𝑥 and the future payoff 𝑉 
increase.  
 The above results have been derived under the supposition that all agents are risk-neutral. 
However, risk-neutrality might not be appropriate for owners of unlisted firms that might not have 
the same diversification opportunities as those of listed firms. Allowing for risk aversion in our 
case would only strengthen our conclusions. This is because there is evidence that productivity is 
correlated with risk tolerance (see Miller et al., 2013). In our model it is the high-productivity 
firms, i.e. the more risk tolerant, which are willing to bear the risk of the costly signal.  
 
2.3 Model Predictions 
In this section, we describe the predictions of our model on the links between foreign 
currency borrowing, sales performance and firm survival. 
 
2.3.1 Foreign Currency Borrowing, Productivity and Exports 
Condition (2) is crucial for the existence of a signaling equilibrium and in particular the 
inequality 𝑅𝑙𝑥 < 𝑅ℎ𝑥. When the currency depreciates it can directly affect revenues through two 
channels. The first channel is related to the costs of production: if firms have to import some 
proportion of their inputs their unit cost of production measured in units of domestic currency will 
rise in relation to this proportion as the currency depreciates. Unless they can raise more funds 
(possibly through trade credit, Manova et al., 2015) to cover the higher costs they will have to cut-
down production and thus sales. Cost of sales will be increased by a depreciation of the currency 
(Cost channel). The second channel is directly related to the impact of depreciation on revenues 
and thus is only relevant for exporters who would face a boost in demand for their output following 
the currency depreciation. As is well known from the trade literature that followed the work of 
Melitz (2003), high-productivity firms are more likely to be exporters and thus our model predicts 
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that these firms are more likely to borrow in foreign currency. The first hypothesis we will test with 
our data is that exporters are more likely to borrow in foreign currency (H1). 
 
2.3.2 Sales Performance 
The third prediction of our model relates to sales performance. Conditional on survival, 
firms that have borrowed in foreign currency will have stronger sales performance after a currency 
depreciation, with exporters being better performers than non-exporters. Therefore we can test the 
hypothesis that sales performance (growth) improves for firms that are foreign currency borrowers 
and exporters after conditioning on other firm characteristics (H2). 
  
2.3.3 Survival 
A final testable prediction from our simple model is that high-productivity firms can survive 
in more states than low-productivity firms when both types of firms borrow in foreign currency.8 
In this case the failure rate of low-productivity firms increases for those firms that have borrowed 
in foreign currency. They fail in states where the rate of depreciation is high just as was the case 
during the East-Asian 1997 crisis. Furthermore, given our earlier comments about exporters, our 
model also predicts that among those firms that borrow in foreign currency exporters are more 
likely to survive. This is because 𝑅ℎ𝑥 will be higher on average for exporters. These hypotheses 
have been tested by the recent study by Kim et al. (2015) who examine survival of South Korean 
firms after the crisis, finding them consistent with the predictions of our model. In particular, they 







3.  Empirical Methodology 
The first hypothesis that we will test with our dataset is that exporters are more likely to 
borrow in foreign currency due to the benefits that they experience through cost and revenue 
channels compared to other firms. We specify our test using a random effects Probit model as 
 
  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗)    (8) 
where 𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 is access to foreign currency loans for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 captures export status and 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of firm characteristics used as controls. Export status of the firm is measured by the 
continuous export share measure (Expshare), or the dummy variables Dex (= 1 for exporters, 0 
otherwise) or Dex50 (= 1 for majority exporters, 0 otherwise). Finding 𝛿 > 0 would offer support 
to our supposition that exporters have a higher probability of obtaining foreign currency loans. The 
Probit estimator assumes that 𝐹⁡is a Normal distribution, and unobserved characteristics of the firm 
are dealt with using random effects. 
We control for a number of other influences on the probability of accessing foreign currency 
loans, including beginning of period leverage (Lev), liquidity (Liquid), and cost of sales (Costs), 
firm size and age. We control for whether a firm belonged to a chaebol. Borensztein and Lee (2003) 
note that the large Korean conglomerates (Chaebols) have historically had preferential access to 
credit prior to the Asian crisis, but credit was reallocated to other more efficient firms in the post 
crisis period. All models include time (dt) and two-digit industry dummies (vj).  
Next, we test the prediction of our model on the impact of the crisis on firm performance. 
Overall, we expect that conditional on survival, firms that borrow in foreign currency have better 
sales performance in the post-crisis period. Moreover, given that exporters are likely to be high-
productivity firms, our model predicts that export participation before the crisis implies better post-
crisis performance. This is because exporters become more competitive after the currency collapse. 




 𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑃𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (9) 
 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑡 denotes sales of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑋𝑖 denotes the export status prior to the crisis, 𝑃𝑡 is a 
dummy taking the value 1 post crisis and the interaction term 𝑋𝑖𝑃𝑡 measures the impact of the crisis 
on exporters versus non-exporters. 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡 is an essential variable for our model, denoting the foreign 
currency borrowing ratio. 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of observable characteristics affecting firm performance 
similar to those included in the Probit equation (8). Different intercepts 𝛼𝑖 control for unobservable 
firm specific effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The export status has no subscript t because what matters for the predictions of the model 
is the initial status of the firm regarding exports, and this does not alter with time. We expect 𝛽 >
0, i.e. firms that export before the crisis have on average higher sales over the entire period. Given 
that exporters benefit from the devaluation we expect that  𝛿 > 0, i.e. exporters will do better than 
non-exporters after the crisis. Moreover, we expect foreign currency borrowing to be positively 
correlated with firm performance, that is 𝜃 > 0. 
The source of the shock in our analysis is the East-Asian crisis in 1997-1998. Korean banks 
were overexposed to large domestic borrowers at a time when a similar situation in Thailand had 
prompted a devaluation of the Thai Baht in July 1997. Nationalization of Kia Motors led to two 
downgrades of Republic of Korea sovereign debt by Moody’s in November and December 1997, 
which would have raised the cost of external finance for Korean firms. This was therefore a well-
defined funding shock for firms similar to the type of exogenous shock used by Khwaja and Mian 
(2008) to explore lending in Pakistan and by Schnabl (2012) in Peru. According to our model, the 
shock would be more severe for low productivity firms. Therefore, conditional on survival the 
performance of those firms that have borrowed in foreign currency, that is high-productivity firms 
(especially exporters), should be stronger. Therefore the sign and significance of δ is the key 
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observation in this equation. Export status will have a significant influence on the difference in 
sales between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.  
Correlation between the unobserved firm specific effects 𝛼𝑖 and the regressors in equation 
(9) would lead to biased estimates. For this reason, we estimate equation (9) in differenced form: 
 
 𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃(𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡) ⁡+ 𝜂(𝑊𝑖𝑡+1 −𝑊𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (10) 
 
where the estimated parameters are the same as in equation (9) and the difference-in-differences 
estimate⁡𝛿 captures the exporters’ advantage following the crisis.10 We take 𝑡 =1996 (immediately 
before the crisis) and 𝑡 + 1 =1999 (immediately after the crisis). Using reasoning similar to 
Claessens et al. (2012) we compare sales following the devaluation of the currency with sales 
before the crisis allowing for export status and other characteristics in the pre-crisis period, which 
are exogenous. Thus the influence of ex ante characteristics on ex post performance can be properly 
evaluated. Since exporter status is one of the key characteristics we infer that exporter status prior 
to the crisis helps a firm to sustain sales growth after the crisis by comparison with non-exporters. 
 
4.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We test the predictions of our model using a dataset drawn from the KIS-Value database 
containing firms’ financial statement data maintained by the Korea Information Service (KIS). We 
focus on firms in the manufacturing sector and formulate a panel dataset from Korean listed and 
unlisted firms for the period from 1990 to 2006. Table 1 presents the structure of our unbalanced 
panel. Firms are allowed to enter, to exit the sample, and to stop reporting for a number of years 
during the sample period.11 Panel A reports the number of firms observed each year. Column 3 
reports the number of firms entering the sample each year, while column 4 gives the number of 
exiting firms. These figures refer to the firms’ first and last appearance in the sample. As shown in 
Panel B, firms can contribute from 1 up to 16 annual observations to the sample. The median firms 
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have at least 5 annual observations. Information about the number of firms listed on the Korean 
stock exchange for each sample year is presented in Panel C. 
The KIS database distinguishes between sales from exported and non-exported goods at the 
level of the individual firm. We use an enhanced version of this dataset that includes details about 
the currency denomination of firm loans. First, we investigate whether firms’ access to foreign 
currency denominated loans DFL (1/0) is influenced by the export status of firms. We construct 
several indicators of the export status of firms: a continuous measure as the export share in total 
sales (Expshare), a dummy Dex (1/0) indicating whether a firm has engaged in any exporting 
activity in the current year, or not. Then we consider different groups of firms according to their 
export share. For instance, the dummy Dex50 distinguishes majority exporters (1/0), i.e. a firm 
exports more than 50% of goods sold.  
For firm-specific controls we measure beginning of period leverage as the total debt to total 
assets ratio (Lev), the liquid assets of the firm to total assets (Liquid), costs of sales over total sales 
(Costs), the log of the real total assets (Size), and the years since incorporation of the firm (Age). 
Age is not included in our model explicitly, but we consider firms that are older to be established, 
and to have had time to reach sufficient scale. These variables are likely to determine access to 
finance and the extent to which a firm can expand its sales. After removing the 1% tails of the 
accounting variables to exclude outliers, our final dataset includes 27,860 observations for 4,848 
firms.  
We allow for the fact that some large politically connected conglomerates (Chaebols) were 
able to obtain domestic finance through state owned banks or their financial affiliates. We compile 
a list of the largest 30 Chaebols from the Korea Fair Trade Commission 2007 definition of business 
groups. There are 116 firms and 931 firm-year observations for these 30 largest Chaebols. While 
we allow for 30 of these groups, in practice the top 5 or 10 groups are the most powerful, accounting 
for a large share of manufacturing output and GDP. Even though Chaebols had preferential access 
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to credit prior to the crisis, it is not immediately clear whether they are likely to be advantaged or 
disadvantaged by their status as large politically connected conglomerates. Many of them, such as 
Hyundai, Kia Motors, Daewoo, LG, SK, Samsung, etc., were international companies with large 
export sales, but equally they were also heavily dependent on state industrial banks, other domestic 
banks and their own financial services subsidiaries prior to the crisis. This may have ensured that 
they were not credit constrained, but because they were relatively inefficient, it may not have 
resulted in substantial advantages in terms of sales growth. Borensztein and Lee (2003) document 
that these firms experienced faster sales growth pre-crisis, and a smaller decline in sales in the 
crisis period itself than other firms. Arguably, Chaebols could have different sensitivities to the 
Korean business cycle due to their size, conglomerate structure and their financial connections. We 
define a dummy (Chaebol = 1/0) for these conglomerates.  
Table 2 reports in Panel A the descriptive statistics of the balance sheet variables we use in 
our analysis. We observe by comparison of the mean values in pre- and post-crisis periods that the 
Asian crisis reduced the average size (Size), leverage (Lev), propensity to borrow in foreign 
currency (DFL) and raised cost of sales (Costs) and liquidity (Liquid) for firms in our sample. 
Export participation diminished post-crisis. The probability values for the t-test statistics reported 
in the last column suggest that these differences are statistically significant. That costs of sales are 
significantly higher in the post-crisis period is consistent with our first prediction that a currency 
depreciation increases costs if firms have to import some of their inputs. Costs of sales (Costs) 
include operating costs and also the costs of raw materials, which will be influenced by any change 
in the exchange rate, therefore this variable does vary between different sample periods.  
Panel B provides additional information about firms’ borrowing in foreign denominated 
currency and various export engagement measures disaggregated at two-digit industry level. While 
there is a positive correlation between export status and foreign currency borrowing, the numbers 
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reveal that firms across all industries borrow in foreign currency. To control for any differences 
across industries, all our regressions will include two-digit industry dummies.  
Table 3 reports correlation coefficients for the whole sample and also separately pre-, 
during- and after the crisis. The pairwise correlations between access to foreign currency loans and 
firm size, age, and being part of a chaebol are slightly stronger in the pre- relative to the post-crisis 
period, but the opposite is true for exporter status. 
Our model is silent about the maturity structure of debt. Nevertheless it can be argued that 
firms that have raised short-term foreign debt might have been more vulnerable to the currency 
crisis.12 Therefore, we take advantage of the detailed information on the maturity structure of debt 
to construct several ratios of the borrowing by individual firms in foreign currency to determine 
their impact on sales. We construct ratios of borrowing in foreign currency to total borrowing 
(BRF/TBR) and short term borrowing in foreign currency relative to total short term borrowing 
(SBRF/SBR). Short-term debt comprises the sum of bank overdrafts, short-term borrowings in 
foreign currency, short-term borrowings-notes and short-term other borrowings. Total borrowing 
is composed of short-term debt, the current portion of long-term liabilities and long-term borrowing 
including bonds. These data are important for the testing of our model since we argue that exporters 
are more likely to borrow in foreign currency. Moreover, conditional on survival, firms that have 
borrowed in foreign currency before the crisis should perform better after the crisis and among 
them exporters should be the best performers. Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics for these 
ratios, and the probability value for the test of difference between them. There is not much change 
in the mean values of total foreign borrowing between 1996 and 1999, but there seems to be a 
significant change in the maturity of foreign borrowing as the ratio of foreign currency in total 
short term borrowing (SBRF/SBR) rises over this period. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the two 




5.   Results 
5.1  Access to Foreign Currency Borrowing 
We begin with an analysis of foreign currency borrowing for production using a random 
effects Probit model described in the previous section and report the estimates in Table 5 Panel A. 
We have based the analysis of our model on the supposition that exporters, which are generally 
high-productivity firms, are more likely to obtain funding in foreign currency than non-exporters. 
To test this hypothesis, we explore whether export participation is a significant determinant of 
foreign currency borrowing (H1). Export participation itself is measured in three different ways: 
by the share of firm exports in its total sales (columns 1-4), by an indicator that the firm is an 
exporter (columns 5-8), and by whether exports comprise more than 50% of total sales (columns 
9-12). Each regression is estimated for four different time periods: the full sample (1990-2006), 
the pre-crisis period (pre 1997), the crisis period (1997 and 1998) and the post-crisis period (after 
1998). Time and industry dummies are included in all models. 
The results in Table 5 are essentially the same across all three measures of export 
participation showing statistical significance throughout. To the extent that firms produce more 
goods to sell in their export markets, we expect them to borrow more in foreign currency. 
Therefore, we are not surprised to find that export status is a significant determinant of foreign 
currency borrowing. To demonstrate the economic effects, Panel B reports marginal effects (the 
effect on the probability of foreign currency borrowing from a unit increase in each variable) 
calculated at the means.13 For all three export status measures, the largest marginal effects are 
obtained during the crisis period, when being an exporter raises the probability of foreign currency 
borrowing at the moment when there are the greatest advantages from doing so. Obviously, the 
marginal effects are largest for the continuous measure Expshare. For instance, a 1% rise in the 
share of exports to total sales raises the probability of foreign currency borrowing by 18% during 
the crisis, compared to a value of 15% prior to the crisis and 10% post crisis. Other measures based 
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on dummy variables show lower marginal effects in the range 6.5 - 8.3% during the crisis because 
they only indicate the firm satisfies the criteria without indicating the extent of the export volume. 
The values pre- and post-crisis are also lower for these measures.  
We turn now to the impact of the other firm characteristics included in our empirical model. 
Table 5 includes a measure of the size of the firm based on the logarithm of real assets, indicating 
that the firm has reached sufficient scale necessary to export and therefore to borrow in foreign 
currency. Size has a positive impact on the probability of obtaining foreign currency borrowing. 
Focusing on the results from the model using Expshare, a larger firm size raises the probability of 
foreign currency borrowing by 24.3% pre-crisis, 21.9% in the crisis, and 18.5% post-crisis. The 
figures in probit models for Dex and Dex50 are comparable. According to the trade export literature 
more productive firms are larger and produce more goods for both domestic and foreign markets.14 
Those firms are also more likely to borrow in foreign currency, which we confirm. Firm age 
generally has a positive but insignificant effect, probably due to correlation with firm size. 
Firms with higher liquidity (Liquid) are less likely to borrow in foreign currency. Again 
referring to Expshare results, an additional unit of liquidity lowers the probability of foreign 
currency borrowing by 39% pre-crisis, 51.3% in the crisis and 25.5% post-crisis. Our model 
assumes firms have insufficient funds to self-finance their projects, which is why they must borrow 
in order to produce - a larger stock of liquid assets reduces the amount of external funds they need 
to borrow. Firms with greater leverage (Lev) are found to have a higher probability of borrowing 
in foreign currency. Leverage has a high economic impact, raising the probability of foreign 
currency borrowing by 19% in the post-crisis period for every percentage point increase.  
Costs of sales (Costs) reflects the effect of currency depreciation on firms’ total costs 
(operating costs and the costs of raw materials) inducing firms to reduce production levels and 
lower the demand for borrowing in the post-crisis period. At the same time, it may be that higher 
unit costs are a proxy of higher quality which is correlated with what we call productivity, in which 
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case higher unit costs should be positively correlated with the ability to obtain loans in foreign 
currency. We find positive coefficients prior to and during the crisis period, indicating that this 
channel is less important as a determinant of foreign currency borrowing after the crisis.  
Table 6 differs from Table 5 in that it adds the Chaebol dummy (1/0), indicating the status 
of those firms that were among the 30 largest conglomerates. While all other results remain the 
same, Chaebols do not seem to have a higher probability of obtaining foreign currency loans than 
other firms due to their size, name recognition, and their exporter status. Importantly, export status 
continues to exert a positive influence on access to foreign currency borrowing.  
Our tabulated results are obtained with the random effects Probit estimator which controls 
for the panel structure of our data and assumes that the firm fixed effects are not correlated with 
the regressors. Due to the non-linearity of the Probit estimator we cannot estimate a panel Probit 
and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Alternatively, we use the simple Probit estimator and 
cluster standard errors. These results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar to those 
presented in Tables 5 and 6. For additional robustness checks, we consider the continuous foreign 
currency share BRF/TBR (borrowing in foreign currency relative to total borrowing) as the 
dependent variable. Table 7 reports the random effects Tobit coefficients when exporter status is 
measured by the share of export sales to total sales. These estimates confirm the positive relation 
between exporter status and foreign currency borrowing. 
 
5.2  Sales Performance 
Our next set of results refers to the impact of the crisis on total sales for firms that are 
foreign currency borrowers and exporters compared to those that are not (H2). Table 8 reports 
results for differences in log sales for 1999 compared to 1996, explained by the characteristics that 
we discussed previously: leverage, costs, size and age. We report the results for alternative export 
status indicators and allow foreign debt ratios to affect sales growth. The ratios we use are 
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borrowing in foreign currency in relation to total borrowing (BRF/TBR) and short term borrowing 
in foreign currency to short term total borrowing (SBRF/SBR). The results are reported in Panels 
A and B of Table 8.  
 Our theoretical model indicates that differences in the control variables between 1996 and 
1999 should influence the difference in sales between 1996 and 1999 for similar reasons to those 
given above. A key influence on sales is expected to be the export status in 1996. This is the variable 
that tells us what impact the export status made to the difference in sales between the two periods. 
Unobserved (fixed) effects are removed by differencing. Time and industry controls are included 
in all specifications. We also control for chaebol status in 1996 as a potential influence on sales. 
 We find two consistent results. First, export status has a positive and significant effect on 
the difference in sales between 1996 and 1999. The positive and strongly significant coefficient, δ 
in equation (10), shows that export status had a very important influence on firms’ sales, since 
exporters had higher sales than non-exporters after controlling for all other effects. This is the most 
important finding in our results, which strongly supports the hypothesis in our model that exporters 
have higher sales following a crisis. According to our theoretical model, this is not just because 
these firms are exporters, but because the firms are high productivity firms that signal their type by 
borrowing in foreign currency, exporting some of their output, and obtaining higher sales as a 
result. Our result differs from the Claessens et al. (2012) finding – that firms more exposed to trade 
experience a decline in sales – because their analysis refers to a global crisis which adversely 
affected firms’ export markets, while ours discusses a regional crisis that did not affect the global 
demand for exports.   
Second, the foreign debt ratio – defined in two different ways to reflect foreign currency 
borrowing to total borrowing (Panel A) and foreign borrowing as a proportion of short term 
borrowing (Panel B) – has a positive effect on sales. This is consistent with the finding of 
Castagnino et al. (2013) who analyze exporter performance in Argentina; they find that once firms 
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become exporters, access to foreign finance enables firms to increase export volume, export greater 
numbers of products and reach more export destinations.15 Firms that obtained positive differences 
in their ratios of foreign currency borrowing in our data (ΔBRF/TBR and ΔSBRF/SBR in Panels 
A and B, respectively) had greater differences in sales between 1996 and 1999. Our earlier results 
in Tables 5 and 6 showed that exporters were more likely to obtain foreign currency loans than 
non-exporters, so again this demonstrates the benefit of being an exporter.  
Other factors had an influence on the difference in sales. Higher leverage lowers firms’ 
sales performance (possibly because these firms are less inclined to borrow). Higher costs of sales 
significantly affect firm performance consistent with the idea that costs of production are likely to 
increase following currency depreciation. Older and larger firms have smaller differences in sales. 
This is likely to reflect the fact that small / young firms grow faster than larger and older, more 
established firms. It is not a prediction of our model, but it is consistent with findings in the wider 
literature on determinants of growth in sales. The inclusion of a variable for the top 30 Chaebols 
suggests that firms that belonged to the large conglomerates before the crisis had better sales 
performance at the outset of the crisis.  
 
5.2.1  Dealing with the potential endogeneity of foreign currency borrowing 
In this section we examine the concern that the current ratio of foreign currency borrowing 
FB in equations (9) and (10) is potentially endogenous undermining our difference-in-differences 
estimates reported in Table 7. In a separate exercise, to make sure that independent variables are 
really predetermined, we relate their second lagged value with firm sales performance. For 
example, we relate sales growth in 1997-1998 with covariates measured in 1996.16 As our model 
makes specific predictions regarding the impact of the crisis on exporters, foreign currency 
borrowing, and costs of production following a depreciation, we include the interactions of these 
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variables with the dichotomous variable Crisis, which takes value 1 for the years 1997-1998, 0 
otherwise. Formally, we estimate the model below, where all variables are as previously defined.  
 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑋𝑖𝑡−2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡−2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜷4𝑊𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
Table 9 presents the fixed effects estimates for the two ratios of foreign currency borrowing 
(BRF/TBR and SBRF/SBR) and different indicators of the export status of the firm in Panel A. 
Time dummies are included in all regressions and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The estimates reported in Panel B include also controls for industry specific effects and chaebol 
status. They are obtained with the Hausman-Taylor estimator, which allows for correlation between 
the regressors and the firm fixed effects αi, just like the fixed effects estimator. Additionally, this 
estimator allows inclusion of time-invariant industry controls, which would be differenced out in 
a fixed effects estimation.  
Across the two panels, we focus on the interacted variables and observe that exporters have 
better sales performance than other firms during the crisis. Similarly, borrowing in foreign currency 
correlates positively with sales growth during the crisis. The cost channel, however, is very weakly 
supported by our results. Panel B of Table 9 provides even stronger evidence that exporters and 
firms which borrow in foreign currency have better sales performance during the financial crisis 
when we control for industry specific effects and Chaebol status. 
 
6.  Discussion and Conclusions 
It is well documented that before the East Asian 1997 crisis both the banking and corporate 
sectors of many Asian economies had become fragile through the accumulation of short-term debt 
that was denominated in foreign currencies. In subsequent years lessons were learned, mismatch 
was contained, and governments built up reserves to avoid the risk of a currency crisis. But in 
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recent years growth in foreign currency borrowing has re-emerged in Asia. While many firms that 
issued debt or took out loans in international currencies are to some degree naturally hedged by 
their earnings in the same currency concerns have increased about the consequences of the large 
borrowings in international currency, particularly when exchange rates might be more volatile.  
Our paper explores the relationship between foreign currency borrowing, exporting and 
performance. It develops a simple signaling model of foreign currency borrowing that yields 
predictions about firm survival and performance during a currency crisis. By looking at this 
question it shifts the focus from foreign currency borrowing per se, to the characteristics of the 
firms that typically borrow in foreign currency and their chances of survival. Our model predicts 
that those lower productivity firms that borrowed in foreign currency and sell into the domestic 
market are least likely to survive a collapse of the currency. The empirical study by Kim et al. 
(2015) offers strong support for this prediction. Our model also predicts that conditional on survival 
the high productivity firms, which are the best performers, are most likely to have borrowed in 
foreign currency. These firms are also likely to be exporters, who benefit after a crisis from the fact 
that their foreign sales become more competitive after a crisis.   
Kim et al. (2015) suggest that “in assessing the risk of exchange rate exposure, it is 
important to know precisely who is carrying that risk. In the case of Korea, small, non-exporting 
firms found themselves bearing the brunt of the economic adjustment” (p. 223). We concur and 
add that among those firms the most vulnerable were those that borrowed in foreign currency. 
The literature has recognized many contributing factors to the East-Asian crisis including 
the surge of capital across international borders, the expansion of domestic credit, the maturity 
mismatch on the balance sheets of banks and the currency mismatch on the balance sheets of both 
firms and banks. In 2002, China, Japan and South Korea launched the Asian Bond Market Initiative 
(ABMI) to strengthen the resilience of the region’s financial system by encouraging the 
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development of local currency bond markets.17 Our study offers support for the initiative and, 
moreover, identifies the types of firms that are more likely to benefit from it. 
 
References 
Aghion, P.; P. Bacchetta and A. Banerjee, (2004), “A Corporate Balance-Sheet Approach to Currency 
Crises,” Journal of Economic Theory, 119, pp. 6-30. 
Amiti, M. and D. Weinstein, (2011), “Exports and Financial Shocks,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 
pp. 1841-1877. 
Askenazy, P.; A. Caldera; G. Gaulier and D. Irac, (2011),  “Financial Constraints  and  Foreign  Market  
Entries  or  Exits:  Firm  Level Evidence  from  France,”  Banque de France Working  Paper,  328,  
Paris. 
Aw, B.-Y. and A. Hwang, (1995), “Productivity and the Export Market: A Firm Level Analysis,” Journal 
of Development Economics, 47, pp. 313-332. 
Aw, B.-Y.; S. Chung and M. Roberts, (2000), “Productivity and Turnover in the Export Market: Micro 
Evidence from Taiwan and South Korea,” World Bank Economic Review, 14, pp. 65-90.  
Bernard, A.; J. Eaton; J. Jensen and S. Kortum, (2003), “Plants and Productivity in International Trade,” 
American Economic Review, 93, pp. 268-1290.  
Bernard, A. and B. Jensen, (1999), “Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both?” Journal 
of International Economics, 47, pp. 1-25. 
Bernard, A. and B. Jensen, (2004), “Why Some Firms Export?” Review of Economics and Statistics, 86, pp. 
561-569. 
Bernini, M.; S. Guillou and F. Bellone, (2015), “Financial Leverage and Export Quality: Evidence from 
France,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 59, pp. 280-296. 
Bleaney, M.; S.  Bougheas and I. Skamnelos, (2008), “A Model of the Interactions between Banking and 
Currency Crises,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 27, pp. 695-706. 
Bolton P. and D. Scharfstein, (1990), “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial 
Contracting,” American Economic Review, 80, pp. 93-106. 
Borensztein, E. and J. –W. Lee, (2003), “Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea: Evidence from Firm 
Level Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, pp. 853-875. 
Bougheas, S.; P. Mizen and S. Silva, (2015), “The Open Economy Balance Sheet Channel and the Exporting 
Decisions of Firms: Evidence from the Brazilian Crisis of 1999,” Oxford Economic Papers, 67, pp. 
1096-1112. 
Bricogne, J.-C.; L. Fontagné; F. Gaulier; D. Taglioni and V. Vicard, (2012), “Firms and the Global Crisis: 
French Exports in the Turmoil,” Journal of International Economics, 87, pp. 134-146. 
Bruno, V. and H. S. Shin, (2015), “Cross-border Banking and Global Liquidity,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 71, pp. 119-132.  
Caballero R. and A. Krishnamurthy, (2001), “International and Domestic Collateral Constraints in a Model 
of Emerging Market Crises,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 48, pp. 513-548.  
Campa, J.-M. (2004), “Exchange Rates and Trade: How Important is Hysteresis in Trade?” European 
Economic Review, 48, pp. 527-548.  
27 
 
Campa, J.-M. and J. Shaver, (2001), Exporting and Capital Investment: On the Strategic Behavior of 
Exporters, New York University, Mimeo.  
Castagnino, T.; L.  D´Amato and M. Sangiácomo, (2013), How Do Firms in Argentina Get Financing to 
Export?” ECB Working Paper, No. 1601. 
Cetorelli, N. and L. Goldberg, (2012), “Banking Globalization, Monetary Transmission and the Lending 
Channel,” Journal of Finance, 67, pp. 1811-1843. 
Chamon, M., (2001), Foreign Currency Denomination of Foreign Debt: Has the ‘Original Sin’ Been 
Forgiven but not Forgotten? Harvard University, Mimeo. 
Chang, R. and A. Velasco, (1999), “Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy,” in B. 
Bernanke and J.  Rotemberg, (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual, MIT Press, pp. 11-58.  
Chor, D. and K.  Manova, (2012), “Off the Cliff and Back? Credit Conditions and International Trade during 
the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of International Economics, 87, pp. 117-133. 
Claessens, S.; S. Djankov and L. Xu, (2000), “Corporate Performance in the East-Asian Financial Crisis,” 
World Bank Research Observer, 15, pp. 23-46. 
Claessens, S. and N. Horen, (2014), “Foreign Banks: Trends and Impact,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 46, pp. 295-326. 
Claessens, S.; H. Tong and S. -J Wei, (2012), “From Financial Crisis to the Real Economy: Using Firm-
Level Data to Identify Transmission Channels,” Journal of International Economics, 88, pp. 375-
387. 
Cook, D. and M. Devereux, (2006), “External Currency Pricing and the East Asian Crisis,” Journal of 
International Economics, 69, pp. 37-63.  
de Haas, R. and I. Lelyveld, (2010), “Internal Capital Markets and Lending by Multinational Bank 
Subsidiaries,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19, pp. 1-25.  
Denis, D.; D. Denis and K. Yost, (2002), “Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and Firm 
Values,” Journal of Finance, 57, pp. 1951-1979. 
Eichengreen, B. and R. Hausmann, (1999), Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, New Challenges for 
Monetary Policy, Proceedings of a Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  
Eichengreen, B.; R. Hausmann and U. Pannizza, (2007), “Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and the 
Original Sin: Why They are not the Same and Why it Matters,” in S. Edwards, (Ed.), Capital Controls 
and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices and Consequences, University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 121-169. 
Engel, D.; V.  Procherc and C. Schmidt, (2013), “Does Firm Heterogeneity Affect Foreign Market Entry 
and Exit Symmetrically? Empirical Evidence for French Firms,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 18, pp. 381–97. 
Furman, J. and J. Stiglitz, (1998), “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 1-135. 
Gilchrist, S. and J. Sim, (2004), Investment during the Korean Financial Crisis: The Role of Foreign 
Denominated Debt, Boston University, Mimeo. 
Girma, S.; D. Greenaway and R. Kneller, (2004), “Does Exporting Increase Productivity? A 
Microeconometric Analysis of Matched Firms,” Review of International Economics, 12, pp. 855-866.  
Görg, H. and M.-E. Spaliara, (2013), “Export Market Exit, Financial Pressure and the Crisis,” CEPR 
Working Paper, 9599, CEPR, London. 
28 
 
Görg, H. and M.-E. Spaliara, (2014), “Financial Health, Exports and Firm Survival: Evidence from UK and 
French Firms,” Economica, 81, pp. 419-444. 
Greenaway, D.; A. Guariglia and R. Kneller, (2007), “Financial Factors and Exporting Decisions,” Journal 
of International Economics, 73, pp. 377-395.  
Helpman, E.; M. Melitz and S. Yeaple, (2004), “Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms,” American 
Economic Review, 94, pp. 300-316. 
Jeanne, O., (2000), “Foreign Currency Debt and the Global Financial Architecture,” European Economic 
Review, 44, pp. 719-727. 
Jeanne, O., (2002), “Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency?” Paper Presented at the 
“Currency and Maturity Matchmaking: Redeeming Debt from Original Sin,” Inter-American 
Development Bank Conference, 2 November 2002, pp. 1-22. 
Khwaja, A. and A.  Mian, (2008), “Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks,” American Economic 
Review, 98, pp. 1413-1442. 
 Kim, Y., Jun; L. Tesar and J.  Zhang, (2015), “The Impact of Foreign Liabilities on Small Firms: Firm-
level Evidence from the Korean Crisis,” Journal of International Economics, 97, pp. 209-230. 
Krugman, P., (1998), “Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises,” in P. Isard; A. Razin 
and A. Rose, (Eds.), International Finance and Financial Crises, Essays in Honour of R.P. Flood, 
Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
Manova, K.; S.-J. Wei and Z. Zhang, (2015), “Firm Exports and Multinational Activity Under Credit 
Constraints,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 97, pp. 574-588. 
Melitz, M., (2003), “The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry 
Productivity,” Econometrica, 71, pp. 1695-1725. 
Miller, N.; Wagner, A. and R. Zeckhauser, (2013), “Solomonic Separation: Risk Decisions as Productivity 
Indicators,” Journal of Risk Uncertainty, 46, pp. 265-297. 
Minetti, R. and S. Zhu, (2011), “Credit Constraints and Firm Export: Microeconomic Evidence from Italy,” 
Journal of International Economics, 83, pp. 109-125. 
Mora, N, Neaime, S. and S. Aintablian, (2013), “Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms in Emerging 
Markets: When Domestic Banks Intermediate Dollars,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, pp. 
1093-1107. 
Muûls, M., (2010), “Exporters and Credit Constraints: A Firm-level Approach,” Rochester: Social Science 
Research Network,” Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1685214 
Puri, M.; J. Rocholl and S. Steffen, (2011), “Global Retail Lending in the Aftermath of the US Financial 
Crisis: Distinguishing between Demand and Supply Effects,” Journal of Financial Economics, 100, 
pp. 556–578. 
Radlett, S. and J. Sachs, (1998), “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 28, pp. 1–74. 
Roberts M. and J. Tybout, (1997), “The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical Model of Entry with 
Sunk Costs,” American Economic Review, 87, pp. 545-564. 
Roberts, M.; T. Sullivan and J. Tybout, (1997), “What Makes Exports Boom?” The World Bank: 
Washington D.C.  
Schnabl, P., (2012), “The International Transmission of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an 
Emerging Market,” Journal of Finance, 67, pp. 897-932. 
29 
 
Sohn, W., (2010), “Market Response to Bank Relationships: Evidence from Korean Bank Reform,” Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 34, pp. 2042-2055. 
Spaliara, M.-E. and S. Tsoukas, (2013), “What Matters for Corporate Failures in Asia? Exploring the Role 
of Firm-specific Characteristics during the Asian Crisis,” Structural Change and Economic 
Dynamics, 26, pp. 83-96. 
Tirole, J., (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Tybout, J., (2003), “Plant- and Firm-level Evidence on “New” Trade Theories,” in E. Choi and J. Harrigan, 
(Eds.), Handbook of International Trade Blackwell, Oxford. 
Wagner, J., (2015), “Credit Constraints and the Extensive Margins of Exports: First Evidence for German 




1 In many respects South Korea is an apt comparison for the recent global financial crisis. The East-Asian crisis brought 
about a 6.7 percent contraction of GDP growth in 1998, and a 40 percent reduction in fixed investment – the sharpest 
decline in real activity since 1950 – which is comparable in many respects to the severity of the recent global financial 
crisis. After short term rates fell dramatically with the devaluation of the South Korean won, credit to the private sector 
declined, and banks were subject to greater, externally imposed regulation, further diminishing the incentives to lend. 
The devaluation in the currency provided a competitive advantage to exporters, however, as this paper documents. See 
Sohn (2010) for an overview of the reforms implemented on the financial system after the crisis. 
2 The broad literature on signaling in financial markets is comprehensively reviewed in Tirole (2006, Ch. 6). 
3 Data stop at 2006 to ensure that our analysis is not affected by the global financial crisis that began in Fall 2007. 
4 All of these papers are purely theoretical. 
5 Given that the sample we use to test our model includes unlisted firms whose owners might not have the same 
diversification opportunities as those of listed firms, the assumption of risk neutrality is not necessarily without 
consequence. When we discuss our main results we also consider the implications of allowing for risk aversion.  
6 We can allow for different 𝑉 values across firm types as long as the difference is not too large so that type 𝑙 firms 
have an incentive to strategically default. 
7 We will demonstrate that for the existence of a signaling equilibrium we do not need to impose any further restrictions 
on revenues.  
8 Strictly speaking in our simple model firms fail because of negative idiosyncratic shocks and therefore the rates of 
failure for the two types of firms are not affected by the depreciation of the currency. But it is possible to consider a 
more general environment allowing for more states in which high-productivity firms can survive in more states than 
low-productivity firms when both types of firms borrow in foreign currency. Put differently, the cost of default is 
higher for low-productivity firms to allow separation of the two types to be feasible. 
9 The sample in Kim et al. (2015) includes firms from different economic sectors observed over the period 1994-1999. 
Using additional information, unavailable to us, regarding firms that submitted a notification of closing business to the 
court system, they are able to identify liquidated and surviving firms.  
10 To control for firm fixed effects we estimate the model in first-differences, which is equivalent to taking deviations 
from the mean (the fixed effects estimator) when there are only two time periods.  
11 Firms above the nominal asset threshold of 7bn won are required to report annual financial statements; firms below 
the threshold may voluntarily report if they wish to. 
12 For example, Kim et al. (2015) find that the net worth of firms that carried a lot of short-term foreign currency debt 
prior to the crisis dropped significantly during the crisis.  
13 There are other issues to consider in this relationship. For example, to address the potential endogeneity of our export 
measures we use their lagged values instead and find that these results perfectly resemble those reported in Table 5. 
Some authors have also paid attention to the causal relationship between foreign currency loans and exporting (e.g. 
Minetti and Zhu, 2011), who find access to finance is a significant determinant of a firm’s decision to export. Our 
model is silent about the direction of causality but our empirical results indicate that exporters are more likely to access 
foreign currency loans than domestic firms. 
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14 A large international trade literature, following the seminal work by Melitz (2003), makes a positive link between 
entry to export markets and firm size through sunk costs (Bernard et al., 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Campa, 
2004; Helpman et al., 2004; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Roberts et al., 1997; Tybout, 2003). Empirical support for this 
view is cited in Girma et al. (2004) and Greenaway et al. (2007) for firms from Germany, Italy, Latin America, Spain, 
the UK and the US. Aw and Hwang (1995) and Aw et al. (2000) draw the same conclusions from a sample of Taiwanese 
and South Korean firms.  
15 Bernini et al. (2015) explore the relationship between export quality and leverage. 
16 We thank a referee for suggesting this exercise. Kim et al. (2015) use a similar specification and opt for estimating 
two cross-sectional equations, one for the crisis and one for the pre-crisis period. We exploit the large panel dimension 
of our data and estimate with firm fixed effects.   
17 See https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/efforts/result-abmi. 
 
Table 1. Sample summary statistics 
 
Panel A. Structure of the panel data 
Year Freq. Percent Entry Exit 
1991 856 3.07 - 11 
1992 872 3.13 134 9 
1993 888 3.19 95 15 
1994 931 3.34 86 15 
1995 1,006 3.61 132 25 
1996 1,028 3.69 133 17 
1997 2,071 7.43 830 513 
1998 1,235 4.43 201 69 
1999 1,594 5.72 305 74 
2000 2,023 7.26 436 121 
2001 2,311 8.30 425 166 
2002 2,638 9.47 420 321 
2003 2,761 9.91 348 352 
2004 2,718 9.76 228 322 
2005 2,627 9.43 145 517 
2006 2,301 8.26 74 - 





Panel B. Distribution of time observations (Ti) per firm 
Distribution of Ti :  min 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% max 
    1 1 2 5 8 15 16 
Note: The sample allows for gaps in the panel, i.e. the time series observations for any firm with incomplete information (less 







 Panel C. Firms’ listed status 
 
Year          Not listed Listed Total 
    
1991 547 309 856 
1992 559 313 872 
1993 568 320 888 
1994 606 325 931 
1995 676 330 1,006 
1996 706 322 1,028 
1997 1,742 329 2,071 
1998 933 302 1,235 
1999 1,297 297 1,594 
2000 1,725 298 2,023 
2001 2,033 278 2,311 
2002 2,350 288 2,638 
2003 2,468 293 2,761 
2004 2,436 282 2,718 
2005 2,340 287 2,627 
2006 2,024 277 2,301 
    

















Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Balance Sheet Characteristics 
 
 Whole sample Pre-crisis 1997-1998 Post-crisis Pre v.  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Post 
DFL 0.486 0.500 0.667 0.471 0.613 0.487 0.410 0.492 0.000 
Lev 0.639 0.196 0.718 0.171 0.712 0.186 0.602 0.195 0.000 
Costs 0.814 0.108 0.800 0.112 0.804 0.108 0.819 0.107 0.000 





























Chaebol 0.632 0.482 0.834 0.372 0.598 0.490 0.579 0.494 0.000 
Expshare 0.183 0.387 0.215 0.411 0.182 0.386 0.174 0.379 0.000 
Dex 0.214 0.291 0.262 0.293 0.212 0.293 0.200 0.288 0.000 
Dex50 0.486 0.500 0.667 0.471 0.613 0.487 0.410 0.492 0.000 
Observation
s 
27860  5581  3306  18973  
 
 
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations. DFL is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has 
foreign currency denominated loans, 0 otherwise. Lev is the total debt to total asset ratio, Costs 
represents costs of sales over total sales, Liquid is the ratio of liquid assets of the firm to total assets at 
the beginning of the year. Size is measured as the log of the real total assets, Age is the number of years 
since firm incorporation. Expshare is the ratio of exports/total sales. Dex is a dummy equal 1 if a firm 
has engaged in any exporting activity in the current year, 0 otherwise. Dex50 takes value 1 if the firm 
exports more than 50% of goods sold, 0 otherwise. The last column reports the probability value for the 









Panel B: Summary Statistics by Industry 
Industry Stats DFL Expshare Dex Dex50 Obs. 
       
Basic metals Mean 0.595 0.646 0.117 0.176 2104 
 SD 0.491 0.478 0.322 0.232  
           
Chemicals and Chemical Products Mean 0.510 0.736 0.202 0.232 2884 
 SD 0.500 0.441 0.402 0.279  
           
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and  Mean 0.306 0.556 0.009 0.131 108 
   Nuclear Fuel SD 0.463 0.499 0.096 0.163  
           
Computers and Office Machinery Mean 0.405 0.669 0.275 0.282 338 
 SD 0.492 0.471 0.447 0.333  
           
Electrical Machinery and Apparatuses  Mean 0.459 0.711 0.180 0.228 1582 
   n.e.c. SD 0.498 0.453 0.384 0.284  
           
Electronic Components, Radio, Television  Mean 0.511 0.660 0.363 0.341 3862 
     and Communication Equipment SD 0.500 0.474 0.481 0.367  
           
Fabricated Metal Products, Except  Mean 0.422 0.626 0.110 0.170 1551 
     Machinery and Furniture SD 0.494 0.484 0.312 0.227  
           
Food Products and Beverages Mean 0.592 0.580 0.046 0.079 1325 
 SD 0.492 0.494 0.210 0.171  
           
Furniture; Manufacturing of Articles n.e.c Mean 0.451 0.695 0.219 0.239 406 
 SD 0.498 0.461 0.414 0.318  
           
Medical, Precision and Optical  Mean 0.321 0.576 0.199 0.211 680 
     Instruments, Watches and Clocks SD 0.467 0.494 0.399 0.296  
           
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semitrailers Mean 0.463 0.507 0.088 0.145 3480 
 SD 0.499 0.500 0.284 0.215  
           
Other Machinery and Equipment Mean 0.361 0.591 0.093 0.148 3470 
 SD 0.480 0.492 0.291 0.222  
           
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products Mean 0.458 0.415 0.021 0.056 1048 
 SD 0.498 0.493 0.143 0.146  
           
Other Transport Equipment Mean 0.479 0.793 0.360 0.338 353 
 SD 0.500 0.406 0.481 0.333  
           
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products Mean 0.736 0.679 0.032 0.121 757 
 SD 0.441 0.467 0.175 0.159  
           
Rubber and Plastic Products Mean 0.432 0.620 0.164 0.209 1514 
 SD 0.496 0.486 0.371 0.269  
           
Sewn Wearing Apparel and Fur Articles Mean 0.455 0.691 0.289 0.292 606 
 SD 0.498 0.462 0.454 0.387  
           
Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing apparel Mean 0.667 0.848 0.543 0.499 1053 
 SD 0.472 0.359 0.498 0.338  
           
Wood and of Products of Wood and Cork,  Mean 0.694 0.550 0.126 0.162 111 
     Except Furniture SD 0.463 0.500 0.333 0.313  
           
Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of  Mean 0.375 0.425 0.069 0.084 360 
   Recorded Media SD 0.485 0.495 0.255 0.201  
           
Tanning and Dressing of Leather, 
Luggage  
Mean 0.709 0.896 0.720 0.652 268 
    and Footwear SD 0.455 0.306 0.450 0.373  
           
Total Mean 0.486 0.632 0.183 0.214 27860 
 SD 0.500 0.482 0.387 0.291  
 
Note: The table presents mean values and standard deviations. DFL is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm 
has foreign currency denominated loans, 0 otherwise. Expshare is the ratio of exports/total sales. Dex 
is a dummy equal 1 if a firm has engaged in any exporting activity in the current year, 0 otherwise. 
Dex50 takes value 1 if the firm exports more than 50% of goods sold, 0 otherwise. The last column 
reports the number of observations.   
 
  




DFL Lev Costs Liquid Size Age Chaebol Expshare 
         
Lev 0.041*        
Costs 0.064* 0.111*       
Liquid -0.151* -0.141* -0.119*      
Size 0.379* -0.141* 0.010* -0.133*     
Age 0.192* -0.184* 0.003 -0.112* 0.562*    
Chaebol 0.101* 0.020* -0.018* -0.044* 0.302* 0.086*   
Expshare 0.167* -0.090* 0.127* -0.113* 0.188* 0.083* 0.023*  
Dex 0.185* -0.088* -0.012* -0.078* 0.289* 0.189* 0.075* 0.563* 
Before the 
crisis 
DFL Lev Costs Liquid Size Age Chaebol Expshare 
         
Lev -0.069*        
Costs 0.134* 0.053*       
Liquid -0.140* -0.137* -0.246*      
Size 0.385* -0.093* -0.015* -0.036*     
Age 0.180* -0.169* -0.051* -0.018* 0.534*    
Chaebol 0.099* 0.040* -0.001 -0.034* 0.319* 0.082*   
Expshare 0.149* -0.120* 0.282* -0.238* -0.008 -0.020* -0.018*  
Dex 0.151* -0.068* 0.172* -0.118* 0.099* 0.048* 0.048* 0.399* 
During the 
crisis 
DFL Lev Costs Liquid Size Age Chaebol Expshare 
         
Lev 0.012*        
Costs 0.127* 0.105*       
Liquid -0.165* -0.167* -0.128*      
Size 0.375* -0.130* 0.028* -0.068*     
Age 0.203* -0.191* -0.010 -0.033* 0.567*    
Chaebol 0.073* 0.016* -0.021* -0.018* 0.266* 0.063*   
Expshare 0.139* -0.077* 0.074* -0.092* 0.141* 0.064* 0.022*  
Dex 0.137* -0.129* 0.008 -0.037* 0.206* 0.153* 0.058* 0.595* 
After the 
crisis 
DFL Lev Costs Liquid Size Age Chaebol Expshare 
         
Lev -0.006*        
Costs 0.061* 0.162*       
Liquid -0.142* -0.129* -0.091*      
Size 0.341* -0.229* 0.035* -0.158*     
Age 0.169* -0.232* 0.032* -0.140* 0.560*    
Chaebol 0.089* -0.011* -0.017* -0.049* 0.297* 0.083*   
Expshare 0.159* -0.114* 0.098* -0.080* 0.236* 0.104* 0.032*  
Dex 0.156* -0.148* -0.038* -0.066* 0.306* 0.204* 0.070* 0.594* 
 
Note: Significance at 5% confidence level indicated by *. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics – Foreign Currency Borrowing Ratios 
 
 
 BRF/TBR difference SBRF/SBR difference 
 1996 1999 p value 1996 1999 p value 
Mean 0.109 0.109 0.987 0.061 0.093 0.000 
SD 0.154 0.168  0.162 0.227  
Observations 1,040 
  943   
 
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations. BRF/TBR is the ratio of borrowing in foreign currency 




Table 5: Access to Foreign Currency Borrowing 
  
Panel A: Random Effects Probit Estimates of Foreign Currency Borrowing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 
             
Lev 0.615*** -0.179 0.600 0.746*** 0.617*** -0.242 0.617 0.740*** 0.605*** -0.214 0.516 0.730*** 
 (0.084) (0.303) (0.444) (0.111) (0.084) (0.303) (0.447) (0.111) (0.084) (0.304) (0.442) (0.111) 
Costs -0.081 0.852* 1.372* 0.106 -0.028 1.098** 1.638** 0.159 -0.042 1.059** 1.586** 0.138 
 (0.165) (0.516) (0.744) (0.212) (0.165) (0.510) (0.744) (0.212) (0.165) (0.513) (0.740) (0.212) 
Liquid -0.810*** -1.873*** -2.787*** -0.978*** -0.811*** -1.953*** -2.809*** -0.976*** -0.821*** -1.951*** -2.852*** -0.985*** 
 (0.098) (0.347) (0.508) (0.128) (0.098) (0.347) (0.509) (0.128) (0.098) (0.347) (0.508) (0.128) 
Size 0.712*** 1.169*** 1.192*** 0.707*** 0.717*** 1.163*** 1.194*** 0.716*** 0.723*** 1.176*** 1.218*** 0.722*** 
 (0.021) (0.073) (0.106) (0.028) (0.021) (0.073) (0.108) (0.028) (0.021) (0.073) (0.108) (0.027) 
Age 0.059* -0.135 0.096 0.055 0.058* -0.131 0.095 0.052 0.062* -0.127 0.091 0.057 
 (0.034) (0.109) (0.134) (0.042) (0.034) (0.109) (0.134) (0.042) (0.034) (0.109) (0.134) (0.042) 
Expshare 0.337*** 0.718*** 0.984*** 0.396***         
 (0.063) (0.205) (0.279) (0.084)         
Dex     0.118*** 0.313** 0.449*** 0.118**     
     (0.034) (0.122) (0.152) (0.046)     
Dex50         0.073* 0.273** 0.348* 0.112** 
         (0.041) (0.131) (0.189) (0.055) 
             
Observations 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 
No of firms 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 
 
Note: The table presents coefficients and standard deviations in parenthesis. The dependent variable is DFL = 1 if the firm has foreign currency denominated loans, 0 otherwise. 
Lev is the total debt to total asset ratio, Costs represents costs of sales over total sales, Liquid is the ratio of liquid assets of the firm to total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Size is measured as the log of the real total assets, Age is the number of years since firm incorporation. Expshare is the ratio of exports/total sales. Dex is a dummy equal 1 if a 
firm has engaged in any exporting activity in the current year, 0 otherwise. Dex50 takes value 1 if the firm exports more than 50% of goods sold, 0 otherwise. Time and industry 
dummies are included in all regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Marginal Effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 
             
Lev 0.158 -0.037 0.111 0.195 0.159 -0.050 0.113 0.194 0.157 -0.045 0.096 0.191 
Costs -0.021 0.177 0.253 0.028 -0.007 0.228 0.301 0.042 -0.011 0.221 0.294 0.036 
Liquid -0.209 -0.390 -0.513 -0.255 -0.210 -0.406 -0.516 -0.256 -0.212 -0.408 -0.530 -0.258 
Size 0.184 0.243 0.219 0.185 0.185 0.242 0.219 0.188 0.187 0.246 0.226 0.189 
Age 0.015 -0.028 0.018 0.014 0.015 -0.027 0.018 0.014 0.016 -0.027 0.017 0.015 
Expshare 0.087 0.150 0.181 0.103         
Dex     0.031 0.065 0.083 0.031     
Dex50         0.019 0.057 0.065 0.029 
 
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the mean. 
 












Table 6: Probit Estimates of Foreign Currency Borrowing – Controlling for Chaebol 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 
             
Lev 0.619*** -0.177 0.602 0.750*** 0.620*** -0.236 0.621 0.745*** 0.609*** -0.210 0.518 0.735*** 
 (0.084) (0.303) (0.444) (0.111) (0.084) (0.304) (0.447) (0.111) (0.084) (0.305) (0.442) (0.111) 
Costs -0.076 0.855* 1.377* 0.111 -0.022 1.102** 1.645** 0.164 -0.037 1.062** 1.591** 0.144 
 (0.165) (0.517) (0.744) (0.213) (0.165) (0.510) (0.745) (0.212) (0.165) (0.514) (0.741) (0.212) 
Liquid -0.812*** -1.873*** -2.787*** -0.981*** -0.813*** -1.952*** -2.808*** -0.978*** -0.822*** -1.951*** -2.852*** -0.988*** 
 (0.098) (0.347) (0.508) (0.128) (0.098) (0.347) (0.509) (0.128) (0.098) (0.347) (0.508) (0.128) 
Size 0.718*** 1.172*** 1.195*** 0.716*** 0.724*** 1.169*** 1.199*** 0.725*** 0.730*** 1.179*** 1.222*** 0.731*** 
 (0.022) (0.075) (0.108) (0.028) (0.022) (0.075) (0.110) (0.029) (0.022) (0.075) (0.109) (0.028) 
Age 0.055* -0.137 0.093 0.051 0.055 -0.135 0.091 0.047 0.058* -0.129 0.088 0.052 
 (0.034) (0.109) (0.135) (0.042) (0.034) (0.110) (0.135) (0.042) (0.034) (0.110) (0.135) (0.042) 
Chaebol -0.208 -0.047 -0.084 -0.252 -0.224 -0.116 -0.131 -0.270 -0.215 -0.072 -0.099 -0.263 
 (0.159) (0.329) (0.491) (0.201) (0.159) (0.329) (0.493) (0.201) (0.159) (0.330) (0.490) (0.201) 
Expshare 0.336*** 0.717*** 0.983*** 0.394***         
 (0.063) (0.205) (0.279) (0.084)         
Dex     0.119*** 0.314** 0.449*** 0.117**     
     (0.034) (0.122) (0.152) (0.046)     
Dex50         0.072* 0.271** 0.346* 0.110** 
         (0.041) (0.131) (0.189) (0.055) 
             
Obs 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 
No of firms 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 
 









Table 7: Tobit Estimates of Foreign Currency Borrowing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 90-06 Pre 97 97-98 Post 98 
         
Lev -0.050*** -0.148*** -0.101*** -0.008 -0.049*** -0.148*** -0.101*** -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.031) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020) (0.031) (0.021) 
Costs -0.045 0.048 0.190*** -0.009 -0.043 0.048 0.191*** -0.008 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.052) (0.041) (0.028) (0.036) (0.052) (0.041) 
Liquid -0.084*** -0.043* -0.185*** -0.114*** -0.085*** -0.043* -0.185*** -0.115*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) (0.025) (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) (0.025) 
Size 0.098*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 0.116*** 0.099*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.118*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age -0.011* -0.017** -0.023** -0.018** -0.012** -0.017** -0.024** -0.019** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
Chaebol     -0.048* -0.003 -0.013 -0.061 
     (0.028) (0.021) (0.031) (0.039) 
Expshare 0.048*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.067*** 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.067*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) 
         
Observations 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 27,860 5,581 3,306 18,973 
No of firms 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 4,848 1,436 2,288 4,174 
No. left-censored 14,321 1,856 1,279 11,186 14,321 1,856 1,279 11,186 
 
Note: The table presents random effects Tobit coefficients and standard deviations in parenthesis. The dependent variable is borrowing in foreign currency relative to total 
borrowing (BRF/TBR). Lev is the total debt to total asset ratio, Costs represents costs of sales over total sales, Liquid is the ratio of liquid assets of the firm to total assets at the 
beginning of the year. Size is measured as the log of the real total assets, Age is the number of years since firm incorporation. Expshare is the ratio of exports/total sales. Dex is 
a dummy equal 1 if a firm has engaged in any exporting activity in the current year, 0 otherwise. Dex50 takes value 1 if the firm exports more than 50% of goods sold, 0 
otherwise. Chaebol is 1 if the firm is part of a chaebol, 0 otherwise. Time and industry dummies are included in all regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8: Firm Performance and Foreign Currency Borrowing Ratios 
 
 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES F3 F3 F3 F3 F3 F3 
       
ΔBRF/TBR 0.195** 0.195** 0.196** 0.179** 0.180** 0.180** 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089) 
ΔCosts -0.506** -0.559** -0.533** -0.500** -0.556** -0.527** 
 (0.258) (0.254) (0.256) (0.254) (0.251) (0.253) 
ΔLev -0.219** -0.230*** -0.217** -0.203** -0.214** -0.201** 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Age_1996 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size_1996 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.032** -0.029** -0.031** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Chaebol_1996    0.199*** 0.195*** 0.201*** 
    (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Expshare_1996 0.141***   0.144***   
 (0.053)   (0.054)   
Dex_1996  0.018   0.013  
  (0.047)   (0.047)  
Dex50_1996   0.071**   0.075** 
   (0.034)   (0.034) 
       
Observations 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 
R-squared 0.171 0.164 0.168 0.181 0.173 0.177 
 
Note: The table presents coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the 
change in firm real sales (ln) in 1999 relative to 1996. The financial ratio used in Panel A is the foreign currency 
borrowing relative to total borrowing (BRF/TBR). Costs represents costs of sales over total sales, Lev is the total 
debt to total asset ratio. Age is the number of years since firm incorporation. Size is measured as the log of the 
real total assets. Expshare is the ratio of exports/total sales. Dex is a dummy equal 1 if a firm has engaged in any 
exporting activity in the current year, 0 otherwise. Dex50 takes value 1 if the firm exports more than 50% of 
goods sold, 0 otherwise. Chaebol is 1 if the firm is part of a chaebol, 0 otherwise. Δ denotes the first difference 
indicator and underscore _1996 denotes that the variable is measured in 1996. Time and industry dummies are 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
ΔSBRF/SBR 0.252*** 0.251*** 0.248*** 0.242*** 0.240*** 0.238*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
ΔCosts -0.444 -0.500* -0.477* -0.429 -0.488* -0.461* 
 (0.282) (0.278) (0.280) (0.278) (0.274) (0.277) 
ΔLev -0.188* -0.195** -0.185* -0.178* -0.185* -0.174* 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Age_1996 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size_1996 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.038** -0.036** -0.037** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Chaebol_1996    0.213*** 0.211*** 0.215*** 
    (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Expshare_1996 0.148**   0.149**   
 (0.058)   (0.058)   
Dex_1996  0.024   0.018  
  (0.048)   (0.047)  
Dex50_1996   0.070*   0.072* 
   (0.037)   (0.037) 
       
Observations 943 943 943 943 943 943 




Note: The table presents coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the 
change in firm real sales (ln) in 1999 relative to 1996. The financial ratio used in Panel B is the short term foreign 
currency borrowing relative to total short term borrowing (SBRF/STBR). Costs represents costs of sales over total 
sales. Lev is the total debt to total asset ratio, Age is the number of years since firm incorporation. Size is measured 
as the log of the real total assets. Expshare is the ratio of exports/total sales. Dex is a dummy equal 1 if a firm has 
engaged in any exporting activity in the current year, 0 otherwise. Dex50 takes value 1 if the firm exports more 
than 50% of goods sold, 0 otherwise. Chaebol is 1 if the firm is part of a chaebol, 0 otherwise. Δ denotes the first 
difference indicator and underscore _1996 denotes that the variable is measured in 1996. Time and industry 













Table 9: Firm Performance – panel regressions 
Panel A: Panel Fixed Effects Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
BRF/TBR 0.000 0.001 0.001    
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)    
BRF/TBR*Crisis 0.070 0.119*** 0.067    
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.043)    
SBRF/SBR    -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
SBRF/SBR*Crisis    0.136*** 0.142*** 0.124*** 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) 
Costs 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.215*** 0.213*** 0.211*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Costs*Crisis -0.113* 0.085 -0.031 -0.103 0.108 -0.016 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) 
Expshare -0.041**   -0.040**   
 (0.019)   (0.020)   
Expshare*Crisis 0.280***   0.281***   
 (0.024)   (0.024)   
Dex  -0.015*   -0.015*  
  (0.009)   (0.009)  
Dex*Crisis  0.021   0.025  
  (0.019)   (0.019)  
Dex50   -0.020*   -0.016 
   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Dex50*Crisis   0.190***   0.189*** 
   (0.017)   (0.016) 
Lev -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Size -0.146*** -0.151*** -0.147*** -0.145*** -0.149*** -0.145*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age -0.015 -0.007 -0.016 -0.014 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
       
Observations 17,257 17,257 17,257 16,265 16,265 16,265 
R-squared 0.133 0.124 0.133 0.136 0.127 0.136 
Number of firms 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,343 3,343 3,343 
 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable 
is firm real sales growth. All endogenous variables are lagged twice, i.e. for sales growth 1997-1998 the controls 
are measured in 1996. Crisis =1 for the years 1997-1998, 0 otherwise. Time dummies are included in all 









Panel B: Hausman-Taylor Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
BRF/TBR 0.000 0.001 0.001    
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    
BRF/TBR*Crisis 0.070* 0.119*** 0.067*    
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)    
SBRF/SBR    -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
SBRF/SBR*Crisis    0.135*** 0.141*** 0.124*** 
    (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Costs 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.212*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Costs*Crisis -0.113* 0.085 -0.031 -0.102* 0.109* -0.016 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) 
Expshare -0.039***   -0.039**   
 (0.015)   (0.015)   
Expshare*Crisis 0.279***   0.281***   
 (0.022)   (0.022)   
Dex  -0.014*   -0.014*  
  (0.008)   (0.008)  
Dex*Crisis  0.021   0.025  
  (0.019)   (0.019)  
Dex50   -0.019**   -0.016* 
   (0.008)   (0.008) 
Dex50*Crisis   0.190***   0.189*** 
   (0.015)   (0.015) 
Lev -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.085*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Size -0.146*** -0.151*** -0.147*** -0.144*** -0.149*** -0.145*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age 0.006 0.013 0.005 0.010 0.017 0.009 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Chaebol 2.530*** 2.596*** 2.531*** 2.284*** 2.347*** 2.279*** 
 (0.812) (0.823) (0.809) (0.789) (0.800) (0.783) 
       
Observations 17,257 17,257 17,257 16,265 16,265 16,265 
Number of firms 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,343 3,343 3,343 
 
Note: The table presents coefficients and standard errors obtained with the Hausman-Taylor estimator, which 
allows (i) some of the covariates to be correlated with the unobserved firm specific effects and (ii) inclusion of 
time-invariant industry specific effects and chaebol status. The dependent variable is firm real sales growth. All 
endogenous variables are lagged twice, i.e. for sales growth 1997-1998 the controls are measured in 1996. Crisis 
=1 for the years 1997-1998, 0 otherwise. Time and industry dummies are included in all regressions. ***, **, and 
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